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Brain-injured footballers, voluntary choice, and social goods.  A reply to Corlett. 
Abstract: This essay responds to Angelo Corlett’s criticism of our paper “Ethics, Brain 
Injuries, and Sports: Prohibition, Reform, and Prudence.” To do so, first, we revisit certain 
assumptions and arguments Corlett meakesconcerning intercollegiate football and brain injuries 
in his 2014 paper “Should intercollegiate football be eliminated?”. Secondly, we identify and 
criticize two key elements in his response regarding (a) “luck egalitarianism,” and (b) “public 
goods.”  We conclude by reaffirming our critical reading of Corlett’s original 2014 paper and by 
identifying further elements (i) luck and the nature of individual responsibility; and (ii) the nature of sports 
as public rather than merely private goods, that he would have to address for his latter 2018 position to hold 
true. Keywords: concussions, ethics, responsibility, public goods, football. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we respond to Angelo Corlett’s criticism of our paper “Ethics, Brain Injuries, 
and Sports: Prohibition, Reform, and Prudence.” We are grateful to him for his extensive response 
and his efforts to develop his position with respect to the support of a sporting practice, closely 
associated with head injuries, and for which the relevant practice communities themselves cannot, 
or will not, assume economic responsibility.  In this paper, we defend our earlier position and 
propose yet further problems for Corlett if he is to sustain both his original and modified positions. 
First, we revisit his assumptions and arguments concerning intercollegiate football and brain 
injuries in his 2014 paper “Should intercollegiate football be eliminated?”, highlighting inter alia 
the connection between the two types of analyses that Corlett provides, namely, the descriptive 
and normative1. Secondly, we identify and criticize two key elements in his response regarding (a) 
                                                          
1 Using these terms as a heuristic device, we do not hereby commit ourselves to any metaphysical position on the 
fact value dichotomy. 
“luck egalitarianism,” and (b) “public goods.”  We conclude by reaffirming our grasp of Corlett’s 
original 2014 paper and by identifying further elements of weakeness in his account namely (i) 
luck and the nature of individual responsibility; and (ii) the nature of sports as public rather than 
merely private goods. We conclude that these issues must be addressed if his 2018 revision is to 
be decisive. 
  
2. Corlett’s critique of our interpretation of his analysis of the arguments for and against 
inter-collegiate football 
Corlett claims that we have partly misinterpreted his analysis of the arguments for and 
against the elimination of inter-collegiate football (Corlett, 2018, 6). In order to challenge this 
claim, we are obliged to quote him extensively in this response.  According to him, he neither 
argues for the elimination of inter-collegiate football programs, nor does he hold a paternalist 
position. Instead, as we point out in our paper, he presents five arguments: (a) argument from 
exploitation; (b) economic argument; (c) academic argument; (d) argument from fraud; and (e) 
health care and medical costs to others argument. Then, he takes the ‘health care and medical costs 
to others argument’ to be “the only argument that serves its purpose and stands critical analysis 
not only in the context of college sports but it also in professional football” (Lopez Frias & 
McNamee, 2017, 265).  
Corlett concedes that we understood part of the central argument of his 2014 paper but 
failed to comprehend some other important aspects of it: “Lopez Frias and McNamee seem to 
appreciate part of the core of Corlett’s health care and medical costs to others argument as an 
ethical one of justice and fairness” (Corlett, 2018, 3). According to Corlett, one of the aspects that 
we failed to understand is the conditional character of his argument; while the other is the role that 
scientific evidence plays in the argument. In his words:  
it is at least misleading to suggest that Corlett (2014) proposes ‘to prohibit the activity en 
masse on the basis of the journalistic presentation of two respected neuroscientists (among 
many) in what is a deeply contested scientific field’” (Corlett, 2018, 6).  
In failing to acknowledge his argument as “a conditional one” (Corlett, 2018, 6), Corlett claims 
that we not only misconceive his medical costs argument, but that we also seem not to “sufficiently 
appreciate […] that inter-collegiate football programs might be eliminated whether or not CTE is 
scientifically proven to be the result of normal football play” (Corlett, 2018, 3). In what follows, 
we respond specifically to Corlett’s rejoinder by showing that his arguments are not as conditional 
as he claims. This endorses our original argument that in effect he “justif[ies] prohibition [based 
on the] economic and social costs that [inter-collegiate football programs] would entail” (Lopez 
Frias and McNamee 2017, 276).  
 
2. The conditional character of Corlett’s argument 
Corlett’s position on the issue of brain injuries and intercollegiate football draws on the 
distinction between two aspects of his argument, namely: descriptive and normative. Normative 
aspects relate to whether inter-collegiate football should be eliminated. Descriptive aspects have 
to do with whether football will be eliminated1. Corlett emphasizes this distinction in the title of 
his 2018 paper, “Should and will Inter-collegiate Football Programs be eliminated?” In this paper, 
he summarizes his position thus:  
If there is a scientifically established solid link between CTE and normal football play, then 
given how costly CTE is to treat medically and given that inter-collegiate football programs 
are not public goods in the relevant sense and given that it is unjust because unfair to foist 
on those not associated with the sport its costs (including those associated with CTE), then 
inter-collegiate football programs ought to be eliminated insofar as they cannot bear their 
own costs in full (Corlett 2018, 6). 
According to Corlett, three conditions must be met for this argument to apply: (a) the connection 
between the regular practice of football and CTE would have to be scientifically proven; (b) this 
would in turn lead to an increase in the costs of football programs; and (c) football programs would 
be unable to cover such costs, which would end up falling on the public purse. There are many 
situations where the three conditions would not be met at the same time. For instance, the National 
Football League (NFL) might cover for the medical and health insurance costs incurred by college 
and professional football players; new equipment might reduce the harmful consequences of 
playing football; more restrictive rules regarding collisions or head contacts might newly be 
formulated and applied; further policies might be developed that mandated earlier and more 
comprehensive diagnosis or testing; or the cost of maintaining football programs might not 
increase.  
As Corlett claims in his response paper (2018, 6), he had discussed some of these 
possibilities in his original essay. Nevertheless, it is important to note a move that he makes. His 
empirical analysis of inter-collegiate and professional football shows how the current situation of 
football in the United States is one where the conditions of his argument are either increasingly 
being met or will be met in the near future. Thus, we contend that Corlett’s normative argument 
when augmented by the suggested empirical prediction has the effect of removing the conditional 
character of the former2. In his empirical analysis in the original paper, Corlett explores  
the question of how likely it is that competitive football more generally will in fact be 
eliminated because pre-collegiate, inter-collegiate, and professional football supporting 
institutions and organizations will simply not be able to afford likely and increasing 
litigation concerning various cases of CTE [chronic traumatic encephalopathy] whether or 
not they continue to be substantiated by sound medical science (Corlett, 2014, 128). 
Corlett seems to assume that “the Pandora’s box of CTE […] has already been opened and the 
scientific evidence that is still under investigation is forthcoming may well be sufficient to spell 
the demise of [football]” (Corlett, 2014, 130). For Corlett, some of the potential consequences are 
that: “the cost of health insurance premiums for football players is likely to skyrocket” (Corlett, 
2014, 124); “[more high school] districts will be unable to afford medical and legal liability 
insurance to cover such risks” (Corlett, 2014, 128; see Corlett, 2014, footnote 23); and that 
“lawsuit[s] filed by [football] players who allege that the NFL knew the risks of CTE to its players” 
will increase (Corlett, 2014, 129). All these “evils” would present a “fiscal threat to […] football 
that threatens the very viability of competitive football at all levels” (Corlett, 2014, 127). 
Moreover, according to Corlett, if the scientific findings on the connection between playing 
football and CTE “continue to provide a plausible empirical link between the playing of 
competitive football and CTE, [then] the health care and medical costs to others argument [will 
become] most powerful as an empirically based moral consideration concerning the need to 
eliminate inter-collegiate football in particular and football in general as an organized and 
competitive sport” (Corlett, 2014, 128). 
In sum, what Corlett now argues is that the current evidence on the connection between the 
regular practice of football and CTE has started a process that will likely increase the medical and 
health insurance costs related to football programs. This, he goes on to propose, will eventually 
lead to the dismantling of high school and inter-collegiate football programs. With regard to high 
school football, Corlett claims:  
it is reasonable to predict what a likely, though perhaps gradual, outcome will be in the 
coming years: the elimination of high school football. Of course, if high school football is 
eliminated, from what league or level will inter-collegiate football programs recruit their 
future athletes? (Corlett, 2014, 129).  
It should be noted that the elimination of high school football would impact college football 
significantly (and, it is reasonable to infer: the NFL successively). For instance, inter-collegiate 
football (then NFL) programs would have a significantly reduced pool of football players from 
which to recruit. Moreover, such players would be of lesser quality than today’s inter-collegiate 
players: “After all, they would lack the pre-training and discipline of a sport that requires a great 
deal of teamwork and timing between players, multiple tasks, memorization of a multitude of 
complex plays, etc.” (Corlett, 2014, 129). Corlett suggests that one potential solution to this 
problem would be that “the NFL fund[ed] its own ‘minor’ league from which [to] recruit players” 
(Corlett, 2014, 129). Having realized the possibility however, he challenges it:  
it seems reasonable to think that the NFL might find it difficult, if not impossible, to cover 
these mentioned costs and remain economically viable. Until now, the NFL seems to have 
survived without paying its fair share of what its own sport seems to have caused in terms 
of medical risks (Corlett, 2014, 130-131).  
To this, Corlett adds that, in order to fund its “farm” league, the NFL would need to “substantially 
increase[e] the costs of tickets to its games, perhaps well out of reach for most everyone except 
the relatively wealthy” (Corlett, 2014, 129). This would not be viable, for, according to Corlett, 
“[i]t is difficult to imagine a traditionally blue collar sport like football appealing to mostly white 
collar types, especially in cities such as Cleveland, Detroit, Green Bay, Oakland, and Pittsburgh, 
among some others” (Corlett, 2014, 129).  
Even if the strategy mentioned above worked, Corlett raises an additional problem. For football to 
survive, the NFL would have to fund its “farm” league. Yet, Corlett takes this possibility to be 
implausible: 
even though the NFL might be able to adequately cover the costs of health care and medical 
expenses for the time being if it chose to do so, it is unlikely that it will be able to do so in 
the future if taxpayers, who currently demand less waste, fraud, and corruption in 
government, decide to target the NFL’s lucrative tax advantage (Corlett 2014, Footnote 
18).  
The NFL could only afford the costs associated with fully funding its own “farm” league if it 
maintained “its coveted non-profit status with the US Internal Revenue Service” (Corlett, 2014, 
129). For, how, he continues:  
can NFL football be expected to cover such costs when taxpayers read about lucrative tax 
advantages the NFL has enjoyed since its historic merger with the AFL decades ago and 
begin to demand that the NFL be treated by the IRS as the profit-making business that it 
most certainly is? (Corlett, 2014, footnote 18).  
If all the events above took place, then, as we argued in our 2017 paper, “the only way to cover 
these programs, in the context of ever-increasing premiums, [would be] through public taxation or 
higher health care premiums’ (Lopez Frias and McNamee 2017, 265). This would saddle the public 
with the costs of funding football programs, which, according to Corlett, would be unfair and 
therefore morally unjustifiable. 
Our interpretation is strengthened by Corlett’s claim that the beginning of the chain of 
events leading to the elimination of football could be made by the mere perception that practicing 
football regularly leads to CTE. In this vein, Corlett says: “even if the relevant medical and brain 
sciences prove that CTE is not linked to normal football play, inter-collegiate football programs 
might nevertheless be eliminated insofar as health care insurance companies decide to, say, even 
in the face of such scientific evidence, target football players/teams with significantly increased 
health care premiums and medical costs (for CTE care) because of the public perception that 
normal football play is linked to CTE” (Corlett 2018, 3).  
What have we established so far? By connecting the descriptive and normative analyses of 
both of Corlett’s essays, our interpretation of Corlett’s main thesis in his 2014 paper - that the 
public will inevitably underwrite head injury treatment – is, we maintain, justified.   
 
3. A critique of two main concepts of Corlett’s argument: “voluntary responsibility” 
and “primary goods” 
 Corlett’s argument is built on the assumption that increasing concussion-related medical 
costs would ‘coercively’ pass to the public purse. This situation, according to him, would be unfair 
for two reasons. First, “the vital medical care required results from an activity which is voluntary, 
intentional, and yet unnecessary and regarding which the patient nowadays understands the 
medical risks” (Corlett 2018, 2). Secondly, within a liberal individualist society, only costs related 
to primary goods can be imposed on others because primary goods are to everyone’s advantage. 
Given that football, even with its vast supporter base, fails to qualify as a primary good for Corlett, 
it would be unethical to force the fund football programs and associated costs on the public purse. 
In what follows, we will explore the two key concepts of “voluntary responsibility” and “primary 
goods” underlying Corlett’s argument in order to submit to criticism some of the main tenets of 
his argument.   
 
3.1. Two types of costs and the principle of voluntary responsibility 
A fundamental assumption in Corlett’s argument is that “no one has a right to coerce the 
general public to subsidize one’s engaging in an especially medically expensive and physically 
dangerous activity” (Corlett 2018, 9). Regarding this coercion, he provides the following example:  
I do not have an ethical right to eat unhealthy foods on a regular basis, not workout 
regularly, become obese, and then expect others (the general public) to cover the 
medical costs associated with my obesity. For it is unreasonable to think that there 
is a correlative ethical duty of others to cover such costs. Nor do I have an ethical 
right to engage in abnormally dangerous activities wherein I cannot afford adequate 
health care and medical insurance coverage for myself (and others in terms of 
liability insurance) as it is unreasonable to think that there is a correlative ethical 
duty of others to cover such costs for me (Corlett 2018, 10). 
Corlett takes the practice of football to be abnormally dangerous. Thus, individuals who choose to 
play football must themselves cover for the costs associated with it. Corlett’s position is a version 
of “luck egalitarianism” (Dworkin 1981), drawing as it does on the distinction between two types 
of inequalities: (i) those resulting from brute luck; and (ii) those arising from option luck (Segall 
2010, 10). Brute luck is beyond the individuals’ control, whereas option luck is controllable 
through voluntary choice (omission or commission). For luck egalitarians, “the norm of equality 
[…] should apply to that over which the individual lacks control (a person’s brute luck)” (Wikler 
2002, 49).  Society is thus only obliged to compensate for the inequalities resulting from factors 
beyond the individuals’ control. In contrast, individuals must be responsible for those actions that 
fall within the realm of option luck. This distinction is key to maintaining Corlett’s position. Since 
football players choose to engage in football voluntarily, then they, and the parties that contract 
them to do so, ought to be held responsible for the harms arising and the means of their 
remediation. Therefore, football players themselves must correct any inequality or social cost 
resulting from their regular practice of football.  
Corlett’s employment of the voluntary responsibility principle raises the following 
problems. First, the onus is upon him to clarify the extent to which football players’ decision to 
play football is characterized as voluntary. To hold individuals responsible for their actions, the 
latter must “properly” be theirs. That is to say, individuals must be the sole authors of their actions. 
Although the criteria actions must meet to be fully voluntary are highly contested, most theorists 
agree that voluntary actions are informed, voluntary, unforced, and deliberated over (Wikler 2002, 
50). These concepts are familiar within medical ethics under the umbrella of informed consent.  
From this perspective, it is at least questionable that football players strongly choose their lifestyle 
voluntarily in the strong sense that Corlett requires. For instance, players are introduced to the 
practice by others (often parents or friends) very early in their lives, developing habits and social 
relationships and an athletic identity that strongly influence their choices as adults, without their 
deliberate consent.  
Secondly, an exclusive emphasis on personal responsibility might be detrimental to the 
healthcare practice. Corlett identifies two types of CTE-related costs.3 One relates to medical 
coverage, that is, to the increase in health insurance premiums. The other has to do with medical 
care and, in particular, with the long-term medical care of CTE patients. Yet it is worth noting that 
much medical practice is grounded in the idea that help must be provided to those who need it. In 
general, medical practitioners’ care (though their sympathy might be an altogether different matter) 
ought not be diminished in virtue of the self-inflicted nature of any harms. As Daniel Wikler 
argues, “All of us gain if and when doctors think of patients as patients (a point that tells also 
against financial screening of patients at the hospital door)” (Wikler 2002, 51). By contrast, Corlett 
seems to imply that individuals can engage in any behavior only insofar as they can be held 
responsible – including financially responsible - for the consequences of their actions.    
Thirdly, the employment of the principle of voluntary responsibility in the health care 
setting is inconsistent. True, some reckless actions might be seen as morally questionable. 
However, not all voluntary actions that lead to disease, illness or some condition that requires 
medical care are regarded as actions whose costs must be shouldered by those individuals. As 
Wikler argues, the concept is often applied to behaviors that people merely disapprove of. For 
instance, he posits, “the decision to have children (now that this involves an actual decision for 
many people) risks the health of the mother. A decision to postpone childbearing until advanced 
education has been completed markedly increases the risks for cervical and breast cancer.” (Wikler 
2002, 52).  
The conclusion that public health services ought not to be expected to make good on poor 
choices is not a self-evident truth. Just as norms of care and justice in healthcare depend on how 
we conceive public goods, so too our norms of responsibility for foreseeable harms like head 
injuries in football, depend whether we conceive of sports as social or public goods.  We turn now 
to this notion. 
 
3.2. Corlett’s controversial and underdeveloped notion of “public goods” 
The concept of “public goods” plays a central role in both Corlett’s papers. Whereas in his 
original paper, he borrows the concept from Mancur Olson’s The logic of collective action, in his 
response paper, he draws on Rawls’ notion of the public good. In the former, Corlett argues that 
football fails to qualify as a public good because “it is only a good for those who voluntarily 
participate in the sport as players, coaches, fans, etc.” (Corlett 2014, 124). In his latter paper, 
Corlett he reframes football as a public good only in “a weak sense” (Corlett 2018, 5). For a 
practice like football to be referred to as a public good in the strong (Rawlsian) sense of the term 
it must be one that “benefits, on balance, a vast majority of the public” (Corlett 2018, 5). In an 
earlier paragraph, Corlett cites Rawls to provide a different definition of public goods as those that 
are “to everyone’s advantage in a society” (Rawls 1971, 267 cited in Corlett 2018, 2).  
Despite being widely accepted among liberal philosophers, Rawls’ account of “primary 
goods” is controversial. As McNamee argues, sports must be regarded “as inherently social […] 
as forms of public ceremonies and all forms of sports as partly both play and display” (McNamee, 
2008, 130, our emphasis). From the standpoint of play, sports must be more broadly regarded as 
leisure activities, and it must be noted that leisure and play are often regarded as public goods, 
even from a Rawlsian standpoint. In particular, Blain Neufeld (2018) claims that leisure should be 
regarded as a primary good in Rawls’ sense because it is necessary for the promotion or realization 
of one’s conception of the good, especially during childhood:  
Within the childhood stages of persons’ lives, leisure time will involve (at least for most 
persons) the realization of many childhood goods, such as creative play, athletic and artistic 
activities, friendships, and the like. So certain childhood goods can be realizable adequately 
for all citizens via the just distribution of the primary good of leisure time over citizens’ 
complete lives (Neufeld 2018, 1068).4  
In alignment with Neufield’s approach, Brennan, Gheaus, and Macleod argue that “childhood 
goods” require further consideration, and that Rawls has largely overlooked them. A broader 
interpretation of the notion of primary goods would allow for considering football as a public good. 
Because football allows individuals to promote and realize their conception of the good, as well as 
to achieve other goods and develop their abilities, football may be regarded as a common good.  
A further consideration is noteworthy regarding our understanding of the basic goods of a 
human life. Nussbaum, for example, takes play to be one of the substantial freedoms, which she 
calls “capabilities,” required for having a life worthy of dignity (Nussbaum, 2013; Bloodworth, 
McNamee, and Bailey, 2012). Indeed, many international organizations such as the European 
Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) regard 
leisure as a public good and some take the access to it to be a basic right (Lopez Frias, 2014). 
With regard to the understanding of sport as display, two features must be noted. First, 
football engages vast numbers of people whose lives are enhanced by their participation in the 
practice. For instance, the 2018 Super Bowl drew 111.3 million viewers, and thirty-three of the 
top 50 television programs were NFL games (Pallotta, 2018). Moreover, a Gallup poll released in 
January 2018 revealed that football is the favorite sport of 37% of Americans (Norman, 2018). 
Secondly, as Morgan argues, sports, especially in the United States, have “narrative prowess,” for 
they play a key role in the way Americans learn “to speak [their] national language” (Morgan, 
1999, 51). Morgan’s conception of sport coheres closely with Taylor’s notion of “irreducibly social 
goods.” According to him, such goods provide background understandings that make the 
experience of other goods intelligible (Taylor, 1997). As the issue of whether or not football is a 
public good goes beyond the scope of this paper, it suffices to say that there are other views of the 
public good that Corlett could have considered in the development of his argument. He seems to 
accept Rawls’ view of public good too quickly.5    
 
4. Conclusion  
Over both articles Corlett has offered an argument to the effect that that head injuries are 
sufficiently prevalent in Collegiate Football that it may be predicted that their costs could not be 
met by those associated with such injuries and therefore would unjustly and unjustifiably fall on 
the public purse.  This drives his negative stance towards Collegiate  Football’s future 
continuation. We have argued his claims to have offered a merely contingent, hypothetical 
argument, is undermined by his substantively negative predictions regarding the scale and costs of 
consequent healthcare, along with the inability of football to look after its own excesses, are 
flawed.  We have also challenged his assumption that Collegiate Football is not a social or public 
good.  None of this makes us apologists for American Football nor the harms that may be 
associated with it.  We are simply in favor of good arguments about sports and their place in 
modern society.   
Notes 
 
1 Despite agreeing with Corlett that the two types of aspects must be addressed separately, we argue that he underplays 
the potential connection between the two of them. If the normative and descriptive aspects of Corlett’s analysis are 
connected1, then his analysis loses part of its conditional character.  We do not endorse an absolute position on the 
distinction between description and normativity.  Rather like the tired fact : value dichotomy, it may nevertheless be 
a useful heuristic (see Putnam, 2002). 
2 Indeed, the combination of both types of aspects aligns with Corlett’s intent of “focus[ing] on more serious concerns 
within the confines of the real world in which we find ourselves” (Corlett, 2014, 117). A philosophical analysis that 
applies to the real world must, according to him, avoid drawing a clear-cut distinction between normative and 
empirical analyses. We concur with this. 
3 To the extent that medical and brain sciences discover a solid link between CTE and normal football play and 
given the current health care system in the US which requires medical providers to provide medical assistance to 
those in need of vital medical care, the subsidizing of inter-collegiate football programs forces economic costs onto 
others (the general public) in order to support it (say, in the forms of substantially increased health care premiums 
and medical costs due to football-caused CTE-related injuries) (Corlett 2018, 8). 
4 To further explore the issue of value of leisure, see Parry (1989), McNamee (1994), and Telfer (1987).  
 
 
5 As one of the anonymous reviewers of the journal points out, further distinctions are needed here. For instance, we 
would need to clarify what kind of public good sport is and differentiate it from other types of publicly shared goods 
such as common goods, the common good, social goods, and basic goods. However, we will leave this task for a 
different work, for all we want to point out here is that Corlett assumes Rawls’ concept of “primary good” without 
providing a solid justification for it. For an analysis of the concept of “public goods,” see Buchanan (1967), Kallhoff 
(2011), Inge (2003) and Cornes and Sandler (1994). Also, for an interpretation of the relationship between Rawls’ 
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